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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - LEGITIMATION OF ILLEGITIMATES
Sec. 10503-15 of the Ohio General Code, known as the Legitima-
tion Statute, reads: "When by a woman a man has one or more chil-
dren, and afterward intermarries with her, such issue, if acknowledged
by him as his child or children, will be legitimate." This act was given
an extensive interpretation in a recent "neglected child" proceeding1
brought by the state to have custody of a child placed with an aunt. The
child involved therein was born at such period of gestation that it was
uncertain whether it might have been the offspring of its mother's di-
vorced husband or some other man. Two years subsequent to her
divorce, intervener married the mother, took the child into his home, and
acknowledged it as his own. In applying the above statute, the court
said: "Whatever male may have been the source of Mary Lou, it is
clear that Hayes has assumed the responsibility for her, and according
to the statute, is the father of the child and the child is legitimate." 2
It may be claimed that such interpretation exceeds the limits set by
the syllabus of the Ohio Supreme Court in Eichorn v. Zedaker.3 The
court therein stated that in order to establish legitimation of an illegiti-
mate child it is necessary to prove that the man who subsequently mar-
ries the mother and acknowledges the child as his, is, in fact, the father
of such child.-
Though not involved in the principal case, the question of a child's
legitimacy is most frequently raised in suits brought to determine its right
to property and thus the collateral problem of protecting the rights of
heirs born within wedlock, as well as the wife's rights, becomes material.
At common law, children born out of lawful wedlock could not be ren-
dered legitimate by any subsequent act of their parents.' But the power
of the Legislature to legitimate or to provide for the legitimation of bas-
tards has long been recognized both in England and in this country.'
' Ohio G. C. sec. 1639-1 et seq.
'State v. Hayes, 6z Ohio App. z89, 23 N.E. (zd) 956, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 154, x6 Ohio
Op. 10 (x939).
ao9 Ohio St. 6og, x44. N.E. 259 (1924).
' But that the syllabus is only dictum and not the law of the case is evident from the
statement in the body of the opinion at p. 6zo: "We are not called upon to determine
whether a clear unequivocal acknowledgment would establish the status of legitimacy in the
face of clear evidence of nonaccess."
'Ross v. Ross, 529 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 34 (188o); Iv'es v. McNicoll, S9 Ohio
St. 4o2, 53 N.E. 6o, 43 L.R.A. 778, 69 Am. St. Rep. 780 (S89S); Allison v. Bryan, 21
Okla. 557, 97 Pac. ZSZ, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 931, 17 Ann. Cas. 468 (igoS).
'Miller v. Penington, 218 Ill. 22o, 75 N.E. gig, s L.R.A. (N.S.) 773 (s9oS);
Miller v. Miller, 9' N.Y. 315, 43 Am. Rep. 669 (1883); McGunnigle v. McKee, 77 Pa.
81, x8 Am. Rep. 428 (1874).
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Different views are entertained as to whether legitimating statutes should
be strictly construed as being in derogation of the common law,' or liter-
ally interpreted on account of their remedial character.' However, it
was said in Re Jessup' that even a liberal construction does not authorize
any enlargement or restriction of plain provisions of laws as written. It
therefore could be contended that since our statute says "a man" having
issue with a woman he subsequently marries, the intent of the statute
is to legitimate the child only if this husband was the actual procreator of
the child. As hereinafter shown, a strong argument on the basis of social
policy can be made for the interpretation of the statute found in the in-
stant case.
The view stated in the syllabus of the Eichorn case1" is taken by deci-
sions of other states with similar statutes. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Re Dexhener's Estate held that it must be the child's "natural
father" who intermarried with its mother to give effect to the statute.
Virginia's Supreme Court laid down the rule that the evidence must
clearly establish that the mother was married to the child's "putative
father" in order to legitimate the bastard. 2 The Kentucky and Missouri
courts"5 have held that mere recognition of a child by the mother's hus-
band is not sufficient to render him in fact the father. On the other
hand, the Indiana Supreme Court, under a like statute, has consistently
taken the view that the blood relation of father and child is not neces-
sary.
1 4
The high degree of proof required to establish parentage by most
states in itself lends support to the contention that it can be no other
than the actual father of the bastard who can cause its legitimation by his
subsequent marriage to its mother.' The syllabus of the Eichorn case
requires proof of acknowledgment by "clear and unequivocal" evidence,
it being inferable that establishment of such acknowledgment is the statu-
tory substitute for proof of actual parentage.' 6
'In re Wallace, r97 N.C. 334, 148 S.E. 456, 64 A.L.R. iiz2 (x9z9); Taylor v.
Taylhr, i 6z Tenn. 4 8Z, 4o S.W. (2d) 393 (193).
'Jame7s v. Janes, 253 S.W. 111z (i923); In re Sheffer's Will, 249 N.Y.S. 10z, 139
MiC. ;19 ('93').
8r Cal. 408, z1 Pac. 976, 6 L.R.A. 594 (1889).
' Supra, note 3.
197 Wis. 145, z21 N.W. 737 (19zS).
'Harpcrv. Harper, xg9 Va. 2io, 165 S.E. 490 (1932).
"'Stein v. Stein, 3z Ky. L. 664, xo6 SAV. 86o (x908)j Helm v. Goin, Z27 Ky. 773,
14 S.W. (zd) 183 (59Z9); Mooney v. Mooney, Z44 Mo. 372, 148 S.,V. 846 (191z).
"Selby v. Brenton, 75 Ind. App. 248, 130 N.E. 448 (921); Tieben v. Hapner, 6z
Ind. App. 65o, xii N.E. 644, rehearing denied 6z Ind. App. 650, 113 N.E. 31o (1916).
IeKellar v. Harkins, z83 Iowa 1030, 166 N.W. xo6x (x9xS); Brooks v. Fellows,
106 Kan. xo2, 186 Pac. 985 (1920).
"'A defendant in proceedings to establish him as father of a child is now aided by
the Itatutory authorization of blood-grouping tests which are admissible as evidene of non-
paternity. Ohio G. C. .ec. 5z2z2-x, z212-z. Cf. note on p -, present issue of O.S.L.J.
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The conclusion reached by the court in the principal case, that legiti-
mation is effected by the marriage of anyone to the mother of an illegiti-
mate child, plus acknowledgment, is undoubtedly a desirable solution of
a grave social problem. Such a result, under our statute, should be con-
fined to proceedings in which the state is contesting legitimacy "as it ill
becomes the state to attempt to establish illegitimacy." It is only the
father and immediate family whose rights are affected by the creation
of this status. The father incurring the duties and obligations of support,
custody, and care of the child, and the other family members being
deprived proportionately of their measure of inheritance, it seems proper
that they be the only ones who should have the right to dispute the
legitimacy.
It is probable that substantially the same effect as that sought by the
Legitimation Statute may be obtained, if so desired by one not the actual
father, by legally adopting the wife's illegitimate offspring."
J. J. F.
EVIDENCE
EVIDENCE - USE OF BLOOD-GROUPING TESTS IN DISPUTED
PATERNITY CASES
The use of blood-grouping tests as evidence in bastardy cases has
been frequently discussed, and is of great practical importance. For a
general discussion of the value of these tests, see Hyman and Snyder,
The Use of the Blood Tests for Disputed Paternity in the Courts of
Ohio, 2 O.S.L.J. 2o3, and for the extent to which they have been re-
ceived, see comments in I O.S.L.J. 47, O.S.L.J. 226, and 15 Notre
Dame Lawy. 153. Recent developments on the question of their proba-
tive value seem worthy of note.
Tests which definitely excluded the defendant as the father were
admitted in the case of State v. Wright,1 but the jury found the defend-
ant guilty nevertheless. The Court of Common Pleas of Franklin
County sustained a motion for a new trial on the ground that the ver-
dict was opposed to the weight of the evidence. In approving the ruling,'
the Court of Appeals for the Second District discussed the use of these
tests in an opinion recognizing their value as evidence. The Court was
favorably impressed by the possibility of relieving the innocent defendant
which a test of this sort presents.
iS Ohio G.C. sec. i5o12-9, 1051Z-13, 10512-14.
x 59 Ohio App. 191, 17 N.E. (zd) 428 (1938).
'Id. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed on another ground. No consideration
was given the evidence question. State v. Wright, 135 Ohio St. 187, 2o N.E. (zd) 229
1"939.)
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